Rod's Alter Ego

Walk, Not Wok

A few comments on selected excerpts from a worthwhile read.

It was clear to Aristotle and to many others before and since that humans are, after all, animals. Since the victory of Darwin, the fact that homo sapiens is one species among others has been part of the scientific outlook. It cannot plausibly be maintained, in the face of the science of the late 20th century, that there is a yawning gap between humans and the "merely sentient" rest of the animal kingdom (Note 6).

Interesting point I think. Because in spite of the embarrassing paucity of fossil evidence to support the claim for gradualism, uprights nevertheless insist that they are simply the newest kid on the evolutionary block. Fair enough; nobody claims with epistemic certainty that this is anything more than a working hypothesis anyway. Yet I would argue that the implications of this gradualism pester the conception uprights have of ethics and morality. If morality is conceived of as a feature of evolutionary gradualism, like anatomical features are thought to be, then, likewise, this psychological feature supposedly appeared ~~by fits and starts~~ gradually too. Ergo, we should expect to observe evidence of its nascent forms in uprights' nearest ancestors. Yet what upright would attach any seriousness to the claim that gorillas are sortof moral, or rodents sortof ethical.

To this more or less "official" view most of us subscribe. But our actions belie our words. We tolerate abominations such as bull fighting, fox hunting, leghold trapping, and fur ranching, in all of which "higher" animals are tortured for entertainment or status-display. For the production of expensive pate de fois gras and inexpensive chicken eggs we permit torture and incredible confinement. We are, further, inconsistent. Some of us protest with shock and dismay the sale of horses for meat but do not hesitate to eat a hamburger. Some of us bemoan the sale of pound animals for research and buy cosmetics needlessly tested in the eyes of rabbits. The use of very intelligent animals such as rats and primates for trivial and repetitive research is protested only by a very few.

Put aside for a moment your pre-conceived thoughts of the required criteria for moral attribution. That's not what this is about. One need not ascribe rights to an animal, any animal, to defend a concern for saving it from unnecessary pain and suffering. Tho to be honest -- and Professor Miller alludes to this elsewhere in his essay -- the greater the evolutionary separation between an upright and the victims of a slaughter house, the less noticeable the shiver is up the upright's spine. Contrast, for instance, the core of your feelings for a King crab versus a puppy as each is slowly lowered by tongs into a pot of boiling water. Why even the mere mention of the latter by an upright would subject her to the severest opprobrium by everyone in her community -- well, almost everyone; some uprights, tho rare, are not biologically equipped with moral sentiments -- whereas the former raises a collective cheer of Bon Appetit!

On the other hand, maybe moral sentiments aren't the product of evolution. Maybe moral sentiments towards animals originated in culture. In some cultures maybe they didn't develop at all, perhaps because of an historical urgency of the need for food. If so, I sure am glad I live in Alaska with Master's moral sentiments. I'd much rather go for a walk, than in a wok, if you know what I mean.